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THE PROSPECTS FOR MATHEMATICAL LOGIC IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
SAMUEL R. BUSS*. ALEXANDER S. KECHRISt, ANAND PILLAY*, AND RICHARD A. SHORE? 
Abstract. The four authors present their speculations about the future developments of 
mathematical logic in the twenty-first century. The areas of recursion theory, proof theory 
and logic for computer science, model theory, and set theory are discussed independently. 
We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty 
there that needs to be done. 
A. Turing, 1950. 
?1. Introduction. The annual meeting of the Association for Symbolic 
Logic held in Urbana-Champaign, June 2000, included a panel discussion 
on "The Prospects for Mathematical Logic in the Twenty-First Century". 
The panel discussions included independent presentations by the four panel 
members, followed by approximately one hour of lively discussion with 
members of the audience. 
The main themes ofthe discussions concerned the directions mathematical 
logic should or could pursue in the future. Some members of the audience 
strongly felt that logic needs to find more applications to mathematics; how? 
ever, there was disagreement as to what kinds of applications were most 
likely to be possible and important. Many people also felt that applications 
to computer science will be of great importance. On the other hand, quite a 
few people, while acknowledging the importance of applications of logic, felt 
that the most important progress in logic comes from internal developments. 
It seems safe to presume that the future of mathematical logic will include 
a multitude of directions and a blend of these various elements. Indeed, it 
speaks well for the strength of the field that there are multiple compelling 
directions for future progress. It is to be hoped that logic will be driven 
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both by internal developments and by external applications, and that these 
different directions will complement and strengthen each other. 
The present article consists of reports by the four panel members, at times 
expanding on their panel presentations. As in the panel discussion, the 
presentations are divided into four subareas of logic. The topics are ordered 
as in the panel discussion: R. Shore discusses recursion theory in section 2; 
S. Buss discusses proof theory and computer science logic in section 3; 
A. Pillay discusses model theory in section 4; and A. Kechris discusses set 
theory in section 5. 
We, the panel members, wish to thank Carl Jockusch and the rest of the 
program committee for conceiving of the panel topics and inviting us to 
participate. 
S. Buss 
?2. Recursion theory, by Richard A. Shore. 
When I was asked to participate in this panel, the first thing that came to my 
mind was the verse from Amos (7:14): I am neither a prophet nor a prophet's 
disciple. Nonetheless, with some trepidation, I agreed to participate. When 
I saw that there was to also be a panel on logic in the Twentieth Century, I 
thought that one would have been easier - after all it has already happened. 
In any case, I decided to start, in some sense, with the past. Rather than a 
prophet for mathematics, I have in my own past been (somewhat like Amos) 
a tender of problems and a gatherer of theorems. To change my ways, I will 
start not so much with specific questions and results as with an attempt to 
point to attitudes, approaches and ideas that have made recursion theory 
what it is and might continue to prove useful in the future. After all, the true 
role ofthe prophet is not to predict the future but to point out the right path 
and encourage people to follow it. 
For recursion theory, as for logic as a whole, there are great theorems in 
our past but perhaps a major share of our contribution to mathematics is 
in the view that we take of the (mathematical) world and how it guides us 
to problems, questions, techniques, answers and theorems. When I teach 
the basic mathematical logic course, I like to say in my first lecture that 
what distinguishes logic is its concern for, and study of, the language of 
mathematics. We study formal languages, their syntax and semantics and 
the connections between them. Our work is motivated by the idea that 
not only are these and related topics worthy of study in their own right, as 
both mathematics and foundations, but that formalizing and analyzing the 
language of mathematical systems sheds light on the mathematics itself. 
Along these lines, the language that recursion theory originally formalized 
and still studies is that of computability: machines, algorithms, deduction 
systems, equation calculi, etc. Its first great contribution, of course, was the 
formalization ofthe notion of a function being computable by an algorithm 
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and the discovery of many remarkable instances in all branches of math? 
ematics of the dividing line between computability and noncomputability, 
decidability and nondecidability. I see these results as instances of the over- 
arching concern of recursion theory with notions of complexity at all levels 
from the space/time and other subrecursive hierarchies of computer science 
through Turing computability and arithmetic to descriptive set theory and 
analysis and, finally, to higher recursion theory and set theory. Each way 
station on this road of exploration has its appropriate notions of reducibil? 
ity and degree structure and its own hierarchies. Our viewpoint is that an 
analysis of relative complexity in any of these terms sheds important light on 
the fundamental notions of computability and definability and can serve to 
illuminate, distinguish and classify mathematical structures in useful ways. 
I would like to mention a few issues and areas where I think these ideas 
and approaches have been useful and I expect will continue to be so in the 
future. Of course, there is no expectation of being exhaustive and I admit to 
concentrating on those areas that have caught my own interest. 
Classical recursion theory. In general, I view the important issues in clas- 
sical recursion theory as analyzing the relations among various notions of 
complexity and definability and so also investigating the possible automor? 
phisms ofthe computability structures of interest. At the general level, there 
are many open problems about the connections between Turing degrees, 
rates of growth of functions, set theoretic structural properties, definability 
in arithmetic and the jump classes. For a whole array of specific question in 
a range of areas, I recommend Cholak et al. [6], the proceedings volume of 
the 1999 AMS Boulder conference on open problems in recursion theory. 
The most important and pressing current problem in this area is, I be- 
lieve, the clarification of the situation with respect to, first, the definability 
ofthe jump operator and the notion of relative recursive enumerability and, 
second, the existence of automorphisms of the Turing and r.e. degrees. In 
the past year, Cooper's original definition of the jump in the Turing de? 
grees [9, 10] has been shown to be false - the proposed property does not 
define the jump (Shore and Slaman [52]). Taking an approach quite dif? 
ferent from Cooper's, Shore and Slaman [53] then proved that the jump 
is definable. Their approach uses results of Slaman and Woodin [59] that 
strongly employ set theoretic and metamathematical arguments. While this 
is pleasing in some ways, it is unsatisfactory in others. In particular, it does 
not supply what I would call a natural order theoretic definition ofthe jump. 
For example, the definition explicitly talks about codings of (models of) 
arithmetic in the degrees. (See Shore [51].) 
In various versions of Cooper [11], Cooper has since proposed two other 
candidates for natural definitions of the jump. The first does not define 
the jump (Shore and Slaman [52]), and it remains to be seen whether the 
second, much more complicated one, does. Cooper has also proposed a 
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number of ways of using such a definition of the jump to define relative 
recursive enumerability. There are fundamental difficulties to be surmounted 
in any attempt to define the notion of r.e. by these means (Slaman [personal 
communication]), but establishing a natural definition ofthe jump still seems 
to be the most likely route to a definition of recursive enumerability. (See 
Slaman [57].) 
In the area of using classical computability type complexity properties to 
classify mathematical structures, I would like to point to the exciting devel? 
opments in current work by Nabutovsky and Weinberger [4&] discussed by 
Soare in his lecture at this meeting (see Soare [60]). This work uses complex? 
ity properties not just on the decidable/undecidable border but far beyond. 
It uses both rates of convergence and r.e. Turing degrees to distinguish inter? 
esting classes of spaces and Riemannian metrics by capturing certain types 
of invariants in terms of computability properties. We certainly hope for 
more such interactions in the future. 
Descriptive set theory. Although I am far from an expert, I am a great fan 
of descriptive set theory and I view this subject as a major success for what I 
have called the recursion theoretic point of view. The whole array of issues 
connected to hierarchies, complexity classes, reducibilities and definability 
are fundamental to recent work in this area. It well illustrates the ideas of 
classification and analysis of mathematical structures in such terms and the 
belief that such analysis supplies important information about the structures. 
At a deeper level, the ideas of effective descriptive set theory ? the direct 
application of notions of computability for numbers and functions from 
classical recursion theory to analyze sets of reals via the relativization of 
light faced results and other methods ? permeate many aspects ofthe area. 
(See Moschovakis [44] and the forthcoming book of Louveau.) 
This topic really belongs to Alekos Kechris and ?5, but for myself, I 
also have hopes for interactions between Borel notions and computability 
ones in the areas of effective algebra and model theory. The issue here, 
as I see it, is to classify the complexity of mathematical, algebraic and 
model theoretic properties in the domain of computable mathematics. This 
issue arises in many disguises some of a descriptive set theoretic nature 
and others more concerned with computability and relative computability. 
(Examples here can be found in Friedman and Stanley [22], Camerlo and 
Gao [4], Hjorth [27], White [65] and Hirschfeldt, Khoussainov, Shore and 
Slinko [26].) 
Effective and reverse mathematics. Perhaps, with the revival of interest in 
computational approaches to much of mathematics, we will see more interest 
in some of the topics of effective mathematics such as determining what 
input information about structures is needed to compute various properties, 
functions and so on. The technical notions involved here include versions of 
intrinsic computability, degree spectra and the like. (For these specific topics 
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see, for example, Khoussainov and Shore [39] or Shore [50] and, for the 
whole range of issues involving effective mathematics, the handbook Ershov 
etal.[16].) 
These issues in effective mathematics are also related to the foundational 
concerns of reverse mathematics which, on its face, uses another, proof the? 
oretic, yardstick to measure complexity. The proof theoretic measures used, 
however, turn out to be intimately connected to ones studied in recursion 
theory from relative computability and the Turing jump to relative hyper- 
arithmeticity and the hyperjump. The basic reference here is Simpson [56]. 
The foundational issues addressed by reverse mathematics are important 
ones and we expect the contributions and approaches of recursion theory 
in this area to increase and prove important as well. A current snapshot of 
work in the field is provided by the collection Simpson [55]. 
Along with the rise of mathematical interest in computational procedures 
come other views of computability that should be worth investigating. These 
should be measures that reflect mathematical practice in particular domains 
rather than just what we traditionally view as computation in our traditional 
discrete, digital approach. One obvious candidate is the notion of computa? 
tion introduced by Blum, Shub and Smale [3] (see also Blum et al. [2]). Here 
the corresponding notions of complexity have been used (for example, in 
Chong [7, 8]) to distinguish interesting phenomena about Julia sets and the 
like in dynamics. I would suggest that we should look for other applications 
and other notions of computability appropriate to various mathematical 
domains as well. 
Set theory. Next, I would like to mention (general) set theory as an area 
for uses of the recursion theoretic world view. I view the early development 
by Jensen of the fine structure of L [33] as another outstanding example 
of the application of the this viewpoint to open up a whole line of analysis 
and investigation. Its extensions continue to grow remarkably on their own 
as witnessed by the talks of Steel and Neeman at this meeting and, for 
example, Lowe and Steel [42]. There is also still room for applications of 
definability, complexity and effective analysis in the setting of classical set 
theoretic problems as witnessed, for example, by recent work by Slaman [58] 
and Groszek and Slaman [24]. 
Saving the best for last, we come to computer science. 
Computer science. The origins of logic were in foundations and philoso- 
phy; most of us on this panel, and in the audience, were trained and grew up 
as mathematicians; the primary future growth opportunities of logic, how? 
ever, clearly lie in computer science. I would make the analogy that logic is 
to computer science what mathematics is to physics, and vice versa. Logic 
serves as the language and foundation for computer science as mathematics 
does for physics. Conversely, computer science supplies major problems 
and new arenas for logical analysis as physics does for mathematics. This 
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relationship has affected, and will affect, not just recursion theory but all 
of logic. There are far too many instances to even mention but I point to 
a symposium last year at the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science titled "On the unusual effectiveness of logic in computer science" 
reported on in Halpern et al. [25] as one multifaceted indicator of the view 
from computer science. 
Of course, Sam Buss has much more to say about logic and computer 
science in ?3, but for now Fll put in a word from my own sponsor, recursion 
theory. The notions of reducibility, complexity measures, and hierarchies 
are fundamental to theoretical computer science. Both below and above 
the level of polynomial time computability we have analogs of the classi? 
cal reducibilities including one-one, many-one, (bounded) truth-table, weak 
truth table and Turing that reflect various views of boundedness of different 
resources. We also see analogs of notions from higher recursion theory such 
as fixed points, inductive definability and admissible ordinals. Interestingly, 
new notions have been developed at low complexity levels that present alter- 
nate notions of computability involving nondeterminism and probabilistic 
procedures among others. The relationships among these various restricted 
(and extended) notions of computation form the core questions of complex? 
ity theory in computer science. What are the relationships among the classes 
P, NP, PP, BPP and so on. We hope that the methods and insights of re? 
cursion theory will play a role in the solution of these fundamental problems 
of computability. 
These concerns will continue to illuminate the investigations of compu? 
tation from both practical and theoretical vantage points. More radical 
innovations are needed, however, to better reflect the finiteness of all types 
of resources. This is a challenge for computer science, computability the? 
ory and logic as a whole. Linear logic and finite model theory represent 
some attempts at addressing these issues, but others are needed that incor- 
porate finiteness and boundedness of resources in other ways. Nonetheless, 
our view from infinity will continue to lend perspective (as in the role of 
uniformity) and so play a role in analyzing the finite as well. 
In a different direction, we return to the original language of computation. 
Here the beginnings of recursion theory have already played an important 
role, e.g. the Turing machine model as a basic one for computation and the 
A-calculus as one for programming languages both abstract and actual. And 
so we come back to the beginnings of the study of the formal languages of 
computation. Along these lines, I would like to close with three, certainly 
not original and probably pie-in-the-sky, problems. 
1. "Prove" the Church-Turing thesis by finding intuitively obvious or at 
least clearly acceptable properties of computation that suffice to guarantee 
that any function so computed is recursive. Turing [63] argues for the thesis 
that any function that can be calculated by an abstract human being using 
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various mechanical aids can be computed by a Turing machine (and so is 
recursive). Gandy [23] argues that any function that can be calculated by a 
machine is also Turing computable. Deutsch [14] approaches this issue from 
a more quantum mechanical perspective. Martin Davis has pointed out 
(personal communication) that one can easily prove that computations as 
given by deductions in first order logic relations from a finite set of sentences 
about numerals and the function being defined are necessarily recursive. An 
analysis based on the view that what is to be captured is human mechanical 
computability is given in Sieg [54]. 
Perhaps the question is whether we can be sufficiently precise about what 
we mean by computation without reference to the method of carrying out the 
computation so as to give a more general or more convincing argument inde? 
pendent ofthe physical or logical implementation. For example, do we reject 
the nonrecursive solutions to certain differential equations as counterexam- 
ples on the basis of our understanding of physics or of computability? Along 
these lines, we also suggest two related questions. 
2. What does physics have to say about computability (and provability or 
logic)? Do physical restrictions on the one hand, or quantum computing on 
the other, mean that we should modify our understanding of computability 
or at least study other notions? Consider Deutsch's [14] Church-Turing 
principle and arguments that all physically possible computations can be 
done by a quantum computer analog of the universal Turing machine. He 
argues, in addition, that the functions computable (in a probabilistic sense) 
by a quantum Turing machine are the same as the ones computable by an 
ordinary Turing machine, but that there is, in principle, an exponential speed- 
up in the computations. How do these considerations affect our notions of 
both computability and provability? For some ofthe issues here see Deutsch 
etal. [15]. 
3. Find, and argue conclusively for, a formal definition of algorithm and 
the appropriate analog ofthe Church-Turing thesis. Here we want to capture 
the intuitive notion that, for example, two particular programs in perhaps 
different languages express the same algorithm, while other ones that com- 
pute the same function represent different algorithms for the function. Thus 
we want a definition that will up to some precise equivalence relation capture 
the notion that two algorithms are the same as opposed to just computing 
the same function. Moschovakis [45] is an interesting approach to this prob? 
lem from the viewpoint that recursion, and an appropriate formal language 
for it, should be taken as basic to this endeavor. 
?3. Proof theory and logic for computer science, by Sam Buss. 
I discuss in this section prospects both for proof theory and for computer 
science logic. I will first present a broad overview of the presently active 
areas in proof theory and computer science logic and my opinions on which 
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Three-fold View of Proof Theory 
Stong Systems Weak Systems Applied Proof Theory 
Topics: 
- Central 
foundations of proof 
theory. 
- Ordinal analysis. 
- Fragments of type 
theory and set 
theory. 
Goals/directions: 
- Constructive 
analysis of 
second-order logic 
and stronger 
theories. 
- Methods and tools 
used extensively in 
the other areas. 
Topics: 
- Expressive but 
weak systems, 
including bounded 
arithmetic. 
- Complexity (esp., 
low-level). 
- Proof complexity. 
- Propositional logic. 
Goals/directions: 
- Central problem is 
P vs. NP and related 
questions. 
Topics: 
- Verydiverse 
- Theorem proving. 
- Logic 
programming. 
- Language design. 
- Includes logics 
which are inherently 
not first-order. 
Goals/directions: 
- Again: very 
diverse. 
- Central problem is 
the "AI" problem of 
developing "true" 
artificial intelligence. 
Table 1. The areas of proof theory, organized by goals. 
areas are likely to be important in the future. I then make some specific 
predictions about future developments in these areas. The section concludes 
with an exhortation for mathematical logicians to pay more attention to 
applications of logic in computer science. 
I am charged with the task of discussing both proof theory and computer 
science logic in this section. It thus has happened that proof theory is 
somewhat shortchanged. The reader who wishes to seek more comments 
on proof theory can find opinions by a large group of proof theorists in the 
compendium prepared by S. Feferman [17]. 
Proof theory. I first present a very quick overview of the present goals of 
proof theory. Table 1 gives a "three-fold" view of proof theory, in which 
proof theory is split into three broad categories based on the goals of the 
work in proof theory. 
The first column represents the traditional, classic approaches to mathe? 
matical proof theory: in this area the goal has been to understand stronger 
and stronger systems, from second-order logic up through higher set theories, 
and especially to give constructive analyses of the proof-theoretic strengths 
of strong systems. This part of proof theory has of course seen outstanding 
progress in the past century, but in recent times has had more limited success. 
The work on constructive analyses of strong systems has become stymied 
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by technical difficulties, and progress has tended to be incremental. Further 
significant progress will require a substantial breakthrough in applicability, 
say to all of higher-order logic, as well as a breakthrough in technical sim- 
plicity. Lest the assessment of this area of proof theory seem too harsh, I 
hasten to add that the methods and results of this area are fundamental to 
the other areas of proof theory. 
The second column represents the smallest area of proof theory. The 
presence of this category is justified by the fact I am presenting the areas of 
proof theory categorized by their goals. The essential goal of this area is the 
resolution of the important questions in computational complexity such as 
the P versus NP question. This question turns out to be very closely linked 
to corresponding questions about provability, about proof complexity, and 
about proof search in very weak proof systems, including systems as weak as 
propositional logic. It is an amazing fact that very fundamental and simple 
questions about propositional logic are still open! I will make predictions 
about the future of these questions below. 
The third column represents the broadest branch of proof theory; it is 
also the oldest in that it predates the modern mathematical development of 
proof theory, with its essential goals stated already by Leibniz. One goal of 
this area is to provide logical systems strong enough to encompass more and 
more of human reasoning. A second goal is the development of true AI, 
or "artificial intelligence". Of course, this area of proof theory is extremely 
diverse, and it includes the aspects of proof theory that deal with reasoning 
in restricted domains and aspects of proof theory that are applicable to 
programming languages, etc. 
I wish to avoid philosophical issues about consciousness, self-awareness 
and what it means to have a soul, etc, and instead seek a purely operational 
approach to artificial intelligence. Thus, I define artificial intelligence as 
being constructed systems which can reason and interact both syntactically 
and semantically. To stress the last word in the last sentence, I mean that 
a true artificial intelligence system should be able to take the meaning of 
statements into account, or at least act as if it takes the meaning into account. 
There is some debate about whether logic is really a possible foundation for 
artificial intelligence. The idea that logic should be the foundation for AI 
has fallen out of favor; indeed, much of the work of artificial intelligence 
today is done with non-discrete systems such as neural nets, which would not 
count as part of proof theory. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one 
large-scale present-day attempt to build an AI system based on logic, namely 
the Cyc system, and this so far has not reported significant success in spite 
of a massive effort. Nonetheless, it is my opinion that purely analog systems 
such as neural nets will not provide a complete solution of the AI problem; 
but rather, that discrete processing, including proof theoretic aspects, will be 
needed for constructing AI systems. 
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Of course, most present day work in applied proof theory is not aimed 
directly at the AI problem. There is a large amount of work being done 
to extend logic beyond the domain of first-order logic. This includes, for 
instance, non-monotonic logics, modal and dynamic logics, database logics, 
fuzzy logic, etc. What these rather disparate areas have in common is that 
they all wish to extend logic well beyond the boundaries of the kind of 
first-order logic that has been successful in the foundations of mathematics. 
I make some specific predictions about the prospects for artificial intelli- 
gence in a later section. 
Logic for computer science. A skeletal overview of the present state of 
affairs for applications of logic to computer science is presented in Table 2, 
which is titled the "octopus of logic for computer science." I have not 
attempted to make a definitive summary of the applications of logic to 
computer science in Table 2, as they are far too numerous and varied for me 
to make such an attempt. The main point of the table is to illustrate how 
diverse and extensive the applications of logic for computer science have 
become. 
Computer science has strong interactions with most of the traditional 
areas of logic, with the sole exception of set theory. First, the early de? 
velopments of both the theory and practice of computer science were very 
closely linked to the development of recursion theory, beginning with the 
emergence of the stored program paradigm arising from Turing's model for 
universal computers. In more recent times, recursion theory has been less 
closely linked to computer science; however, developments in complexity 
theory have often been inspired by constructions in recursion theory. Proof 
theory has many connections to computer science; indeed, the bulk of the 
work in the third category of 'applied proof theory' in Table 1 is oriented 
towards applications in computer science. In addition, the second category 
of proof theory has been found to have many connections to complexity 
theory. There are likewise many applications of model theory in computer 
science as well: in Table 2 these include finite model theory, database theory, 
and model-checking. More generally, whenever one deals with the semantics 
of a language, one is implicitly doing model theory. 
Future directions and some predictions. The above overviews of proof the? 
ory and of logic for computer science indicate the directions that I feel will 
be their most important areas for future development. To be even more 
explicit about my expectations for the future, I will now make a series of 
quite specific predictions about when we may solve the important problems 
in these areas. 
P versus NP and related questions. Although progress in actually solving 
the P versus NP problem has been slow, there has been a vast amount of work 
related to P, NP and other complexity classes. I do not believe that there 
should be any inherent reason why a solution to the P versus NP problem 
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Weak proof systems 
Resolution 
Logic programming 
Constraint logic 
programming 
Theorem provers 
Equational logics 
Term rewriting 
Behavioral logics 
Nonmonotonic logics 
AI 
Model checking 
Strong proof systems 
Polymorphism 
Object-oriented 
languages 
Abstract datatypes 
A-calculi 
Combinatory logics 
Functional programming 
Category theory 
Realizability 
Language design 
Programming languages 
Denotational semantics 
Query languages 
Grammars/parsing 
Automata theory 
Natural language 
processing 
Real computation 
Real closed fields 
Geometry 
Complexity of 
real computation 
Hybrid systems 
Computer algebra 
systems 
Verification 
Program correctness 
Hardware verification 
Fault-tolerance 
Proof-carrying code 
Liveness/safeness 
Other logics 
Database languages 
Least fixed points 
Modal logics 
Dynamic logics 
Theories of knowledge 
Resource-aware logics 
Linear logic 
Complexity theory 
Reducibility 
Oracles 
Feasible complexity 
P vs. NP 
Circuit complexity 
Parallel complexity 
Finite model theory 
Diagonalization 
Natural Proofs 
Proof complexity 
Craig interpolation 
Learning theory 
Bounded arithmetic 
Probabilistic computation 
Randomized 
computation 
Probabilistic proofs 
Interactive proofs 
PCP, Holographic proofs 
Quantum computing 
Table 2. The octopus of logic for computer science. 
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should be difficult, but rather think we just need to find the right idea. Thus 
I make the following prediction. 
Prediction 1. The P versus NP problem {and many related questions in 
complexity theory) will be solvedby the following date:1 
2010 ?10 years. 
I further predict that P is distinct from NP; however, I am agnostic 
about the truth of many of the commonly conjectured cryptographic con- 
jectures. 
I hope that the solution to the P versus NP problem will be some kind 
of extension of the diagonalization method, that is to say, that there will 
be some logical reasoning extending ideas of self-reference, which will be 
able to resolve the P/NP problem. The alternative to a logical solution of 
this type would be a combinatorial proof more in the lines of the so-far 
obtained circuit lower bounds of Yao, Hastad, Razborov, Smolensky, and 
others. To my mind, a combinatorial proof would be a bit disappointing and 
a logical proof would be far preferable. Obviously, a logical proof would be 
a tremendous boost to the prestige and importance of logic. 
Two promising recent approaches to solving the P versus NP problem 
include recent work on diagonalization (by Fortnow and others) and on 
natural proofs and Craig interpolation (beginning with the work of Razborov 
and Rudich). More broadly, much work in weak first-order theories and on 
propositional proof complexity is motivated by the desire to find a logical 
proof that P j- NP. 
Future problems in proof complexity. Probably the most important prob? 
lem in proof complexity is to better understand the structure of propositional 
and first-order proofs with cuts. 
Another very important problem is to either find, or prove impossible, 
proof search procedures which both (a) are more efficient than human math- 
ematicians, and (b) yield humanly intelligible proofs. However, I think this 
problem is extremely difficult and can be accomplished only with the solution 
ofthe next problem. 
Artificial intelligence. As discussed above, true AI will involve semantic 
reasoning based on machine "understanding." I do not expect that artificial 
intelligence will be an all-or-nothing event ofthe kind frequently envisioned 
in popular literature where we one day suddenly discover that machines have 
become intelligent. I also think that some of the currently expressed fears 
about the dangers of artificial intelligence are way over-blown. Rather, I 
predict that progress in artificial intelligence will be a long, slow process of 
incremental gains. Nonetheless, I make the following prediction. 
1 These predictions were formulated in June 2000. 
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Prediction 2. There will be limited but significant success in artificial in- 
telligence by 
2050 ?30 years. 
As discussed earlier, I predict that success in artificial intelligence will re? 
quire logic-based reasoning. By "limited, but significant success", I envision 
that artificial intelligence may be successful in some relatively broad domain 
of knowledge which is generally acknowledged as involving operational un? 
derstanding of semantic concepts. 
One good possibility for a first knowledge domain for the initial artificial 
intelligence systems is the area of mathematical reasoning. There are several 
advantages to mathematical reasoning as a knowledge domain. Firstly, 
a computer can interact more-or-less on an equal footing with a human 
since no physical interaction is required. Secondly, the domain is precisely 
describable with fixed rules. Thirdly, reasoning in mathematics requires both 
creativity and a significant semantic understanding ofthe subject matter, and 
thus represents a significant challenge for an AI system. 
This leads to the next prediction. 
Prediction 3. Computer databases of mathematical knowledge will con- 
tain, organize, and retrieve most ofthe known mathematical literature, by 
2030 ?10 years. 
The first step in fulfilling this prediction is to design a formal language 
which can faithfully represent mathematical objects and constructions in a 
flexible, extensible way. Perhaps an object-oriented language would be a 
good choice for this; however, present-day object-oriented languages are not 
adequate for representing mathematical objects. 
One of the original stated goals of mathematical logic was to provide a 
foundational understanding of mathematics. Quite possibly, the next major 
step forward in the foundations of mathematics will occur in conjunction 
with the development of systems fulfilling Prediction 3 or perhaps even with 
AI systems for mathematical reasoning. 
The relation of logic and computer science. As illustrated in the "octopus", 
the area of logic for computer science is a very active, vital and diverse 
discipline. Indeed, it is likely that there are more people working on logic 
within computer science than outside of computer science. 
In addition, many of the recent developments in computer science call 
into question the fundamental concepts of mathematical logic. For in? 
stance, the introduction of probabilistic proofs and interactive proofs and 
the possibility of quantum computing, threaten the correctness of two of 
the most fundamental notions in logic, namely the notions of "proof" and 
"computability".2 
2In his talk at the Annual ASL Meeting in June 2000, A. Widgerson gave an illuminating 
survey of some of these new notions for proof and computability that have arisen from the 
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However, the so-called core areas of logic have historically slighted or 
ignored developments in computer science. Of course, this is not universally 
true and there are numerous examples of cross-over research; furthermore, in 
recent years, the use of logic in computer science has reached a critical mass 
and it is no longer really possible for core areas of logic to ignore applications 
of logic for computer science. Nonetheless, I think most people would agree 
that there is a significant cultural separation between the traditional areas of 
logic and the use of logic for computer science. 
This separation started before my time, so it is difficult for me to say with 
any certainty why it occurred. But my impression is that the separation arose 
in part because, as the field of theoretical computer science began, the work 
lacked focus, seemed somewhat ad hoc and overly concrete, and sometimes 
lacked depth. (Of course, this is not unexpected in a field which was still 
in its formative stages.) By comparison, logic in the 1960's was embarked 
on a grand project of building coherent and deep theories about large-scale 
concepts, such as large cardinals, higher notions of computability, stronger 
constructive theories, etc. The work in computer science took the opposite 
direction of looking at low-level complexity, expressibility and provability in 
weak languages, etc. After about fifty years of work, theoretical computer 
science has reached the point where on one hand it is a mature field with 
deep and far-reaching results, but, on the other hand, still has extremely 
basic open questions: questions such as whether P is equal to NP or whether 
mathematically secure cryptography is possible. 
Stronger ties between mathematical logic and computer science certainly 
need to be encouraged. The field of theoretical computer science has grown 
extremely large, but is still very much in a formative stage, with many key 
theorems still to be proved and very many advances still needed. Theoretical 
computer science offers many new applications of logic, and challenges or 
extends many ofthe fundamental notions of mathematical logic. 
Acknowledgement. I wish to thank Jeff Remmel for comments on an earlier 
draft of this section. 
?4. Model theory, by Anand Pillay. 
My aim is to describe some trends and perspectives in model theory. This 
article is an expanded version of my talk in the "Panel ofthe Future" at the 
ASL meeting in Urbana. I will also incorporate some points which came out 
during the subsequent discussion, and so this article may have a somewhat 
polemical flavour. 
Wilfrid Hodges' book Model Theory [29] is a basic text for the subject 
and its comprehensive bibliography can be used as a reference for much 
study of the mathematical foundations of cryptography using notions of probabilistic proof 
and interactive proofs and based on complexity conjectures. 
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of the work cited in the present article, in particular for everything in the 
introduction. 
As in Kechris' article it is useful to distinguish between internal and ex- 
ternal aspects of research in model theory. One could also call these aspects 
inward and outward-looking. Of course this distinction is not clear-cut, and 
in fact I want to describe a remarkable unification that has been in process 
for a few years. In any case, this inward versus outward dichotomy in no way 
corresponds to logic (or foundations) versus mathematics (or applications). 
By inward-looking I mean the development and study of concepts, prob? 
lems, etc, proper to model theory itself. Included here are the compactness 
theorem for first order logic (Godel, Malcev, Tarski), the theory of quantifier- 
elimination and model completeness (Tarski, Robinson), homogeneous- 
universal and saturated models (Morley-Vaught), countable models of com? 
plete theories (Vaught), omitting types, products (Feferman-Vaught), gen- 
eralized quantifiers, infinitary logics,... Shelah's work on classification the? 
ory, following Morley's work on uncountably categorical theories, possibly 
represented the first fully-fledged program within model theory proper. The 
nature ofthe problem, as well as various theorems of Shelah himself, allowed 
him to restrict his attention to a rather small class of first order theories, the 
stable ones, for which a deep theory was developed. 
By outward-looking I mean the use of model-theoretic methods in the 
study of specific structures or theories from mathematics and even from 
logic itself. Early such work was Malcev's use of the compactness theorem 
to prove local theorems in group theory. One should include completeness, 
model-completeness, and quantifier-elimination results for abelian groups 
(Szmielew) and various classes of fields such as real-closed (Tarski), alge- 
braically closed (Robinson, Tarski), /?-adically closed (Ax-Kochen, Ershov, 
Macintyre), differentially closed (Robinson) etc, and resulting applications. 
One should also include here nonstandard analysis as well as the use of 
model-theoretic methods (such as nonstandard models) in set theory and in 
the study of Peano arithmetic and its fragments. Among the past successes 
of "outward-looking" model theory are the Ax-Kochen-Ershov analysis of 
Henselian valued fields and the resulting asymptotic solution to a conjecture 
of E. Artin. 
The current situation. The 70's and 80's saw something of a separation 
between (i) those interested primarily in model theory as a tool for doing 
mathematics (or logic) and (ii) those, often working in and around stability 
theory, for whom model theory was also an end in itself. This separation is 
again only an approximation to the truth: there were people on both sides 
(and also on neither side), and already results of Zilber, Cherlin, Harrington 
and Lachlan, and Macintyre, had connected the pure theory with some basic 
structures of mathematics. In any case, the "separation" referred to above 
gave rise to a necessary and important internal development of the subject. 
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Even though there were good relations and mutual admiration between the 
different "camps", some people in group (i) were somewhat suspicious of 
what they saw as overtly set-theoretic preoccupations in Shelah's program 
and theory. 
The last ten or fifteen years have seen a remarkable unification or even 
re-unification of these differing trends and emphases. One aspect is that the 
machinery and conceptual framework of stability theory has been brought to 
bear on the analysis of concrete structures in new ways. Related to this is that 
various notions/dichotomies in stability theory turn out to have meaning, 
not only for the general theory, but for the (outside) mathematical world. 
(Actually I am here talking not about stability theory per se but what one 
might call "generalized stability theory", the development of the machin? 
ery of "independence", dimension theory, orthogonality, in model-theoretic 
contexts both broader than and outside stable theories, such as simple the? 
ories and 0-minimal theories.) Going the other way, a kind of sensitivity 
to the mathematical world, especially what one may call a "geometric sensi- 
bility" (complementing the usual "set-theoretic sensibility" characteristic of 
logicians) has influenced the pure theory. 
As a result of these and earlier developments, model theory has assumed a 
rather new role, complementing the classical "foundations of mathematics". 
This is reflected in Hrushovski's description of model theory as "the geog- 
raphy of tame mathematics". I give no definition of "tame mathematics" 
or "tame structures". The real, /?-adie, and complex fields are tame. The 
ring of integers (and field of rationals) are very nontame (or wild) as is any 
structure which interprets them. Making sense of the tame/wild borderline 
becomes a mathematical issue. Generalized stability theory tends to rule out 
the interpretability of wild structures. 
Let me give a couple of examples ofthe unification referred to above. The 
first is the amazing journey from finite fields to the "Independence Theorem" 
for simple theories. James Ax established the decidability of the theory of 
finite fields in the 60's, using among other things the Lang-Weil estimates 
for the number of points on varieties over finite fields. In spite of much 
work on pseudofinite fields and their generalizations, pseudo-algebraically 
closed fields, the connection with abstract model-theoretic notions remained 
obscure. Shelah [49] introduced simple theories in the late 70's as theories 
without the "tree property" (a certain combinatorial property of formulas) 
generalizing stable theories (theories without the "order property"). His 
idea was that the machinery of stability theory (such as forking) might gen- 
eralize to simple theories. Although Shelah made several crucial insights, 
the situation remained problematic, and the subject was not developed fur? 
ther until the mid 90's. In the early 90's, Chatzidakis, van den Dries and 
Macintyre, continuing Ax's work, gave a description of definable sets in fi? 
nite fields (and thus in the limit, pseudofinite fields), associating to definable 
This content downloaded from 131.215.71.79 on Thu, 16 May 2013 14:09:08 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PROSPECTS FOR MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 185 
sets both dimensions and measures, and asking several questions (such as 
the status of "imaginaries" in pseudofinite fields). I remember receiving the 
preprint and leafing through it with wonder late one afternoon in Notre 
Dame. Hrushovski [30] went further than I did. He answered the ques? 
tions, in a more general context, theories of finite Si-rank, and proved the 
"Independence Theorem" for these theories, a result concerning the amal- 
gamation of free extensions of types. In the meantime Kim [40] had shown 
that the basic theory of forking does indeed go through for Shelah's simple 
theories. Motivated by Hrushovski's work (as well as Shelah's earlier work), 
this Independence Theorem was proved for arbitrary simple theories, and 
was moreover observed to be a characteristic property of simple theories 
[41]. 
Another example is 0-minimality. The notion of 0-minimality was de- 
veloped both as an abstraction of the properties of semialgebraic sets over 
the reals, and as an analogue of strong minimality in the presence of a total 
ordering (see [64]). In any case, if one allows the notion of a total ordering as 
belonging to logic, the classification of 0-minimal structures is an issue also 
of pure logic. A theorem of Peterzil and Starchenko [47] recovers (expan- 
sions of) real closed fields from 0-minimality. This should be considered as a 
foundational result in the new sense: from a notion of pure logic one recov? 
ers model-theoretically (expansions of) real algebraic geometry. Hrushovski 
and Zilber in an earlier paper [32] had already proved a similar result for 
"Zariski geometries", recovering algebraic geometry. 
Major results ofthe 90's were Wilkie's proof of model-completeness (and 
o-minimality) ofthe real field equipped with the exponential function [66], 
and Hrushovski's proof ofthe Mordell-Lang conjecture for function fields in 
all characteristics [31]. Wilkie's ingenious proof made use ofthe general the? 
ory of 0-minimality. There is continuing work on finding richer 0-minimal 
expansions of the real field. Hrushovski's work was informed by almost all 
the accumulated results in stability theory, geometric stability theory and 
stability-theoretic algebra (differentially closed fields and separably closed 
fields). From this work and ongoing work by Hrushovski and others (such 
as Scanlon) one sees that the model-theoretic/stability-theoretic distinction 
between linear (or modular) and nonlinear (nonmodular) behaviour of de? 
finable sets has meaning in the world of geometry and number theory. 
The terms "applied model theory" and "applied model-theorists" have 
been recently bandied around by various people, to describe in a blanket 
fashion much of the current work in model theory and its practitioners. I 
hope that the above discussion and examples show that this is just wrong and 
moreover completely misses the point. Although individuals may choose 
to view themselves as "applied", what is specific to current developments 
is not a shifting of attention to the external mathematical world, but the 
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mutual interaction between external and internal points of view, and the 
corresponding enrichment of both. 
There is now a reasonably coherent sense of what it means to understand 
a structure: it means understanding the category of definable sets (including 
quotients by definable equivalence relations). Generalized stability theory 
gives a host of concepts and tools which inform this analysis: dimension the? 
ory (the assignment of meaningful ordinal-valued dimensions to definable 
sets, invariant under definable bijection), orthogonality, geometries, defin? 
able groups and homogeneous spaces. As mentioned earlier, the contexts 
in which such tools are applicable tend to rule out Godel undecidability 
phenomena. Interpretability is a key (even characteristic) notion, and in a 
tautological sense the business of "pure" model theory becomes the classifi- 
cation of first order theories up to bi-interpretability. 
It is worth pointing out what some may consider paradoxical in foun? 
dations, model theory and the wild/tame distinction. From a classical 
foundational point of view the objects of mathematics which can be most 
immediately grasped are the "accessible domains" referred to in Sieg's talk 
(such as the set of natural numbers equipped with all its arithmetic oper- 
ations). On top of these are built the set-theoretically more complicated 
objects of mathematics. In fact it is some of these latter objects (such as 
locally compact fields), which, once their set-theoretic genesis is forgotten, 
we have direct access to, via quantifier-elimination and decidability theo? 
rems. The accessible domains, such as number fields and their absolute 
Galois groups, although among the central objects in mathematics, remain 
mysterious in many ways. It is typical in mathematics to approach problems 
about these objects via tame objects (such as via the Hasse principle and its 
obstructions). 
There are many important current areas of research in and around model 
theory which are not directly included in the above discussion. The model 
theory of modules has been a particularly active area. The Ziegler spec- 
trum of a ring, originating from model-theoretic considerations (positive- 
primitive formulas) is now a key notion and tool in the representation the? 
ory of rings. In this case too, the stability-theoretic perspective has been 
important. Work on generalized quantifiers and infinitary logic continues, 
especially in the context of "nonstructure theorems" by Shelah and his col- 
laborators. The subject "finite model theory", the study of definable classes 
of finite structures and definability in finite structures has also been rather 
active, with connections to computer science and complexity. In this context 
first order definability is often the wrong notion to consider and either frag? 
ments (such as first order logic with finitely many variables) or other logics 
are more appropriate. Even in the context of first order definability on infinite 
structures, nonfirst order considerations naturally arise, for example when 
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one wants to consider type-definable sets and even their quotients by type- 
definable equivalence relations as structures in their own right. Although 
nonstandard analysis has long ago become a separate subject, model theory 
has been enriched by the development (by Keisler [38], Henson and others) 
of appropriate logics and tools for dealing with metric spaces, Banach spaces 
and the like. 
The future. I will not try to predict developments but will limit myself to 
discussing a few "themes" (and problems) which are mostly related to the 
current developments discussed above. This is of course both limited and 
influenced by my own knowledge and preoccupations. 
Foundations of model theory. What is the right language and level of gener- 
ality for model theory? The traditional framework of one-sorted structures 
and their point-sets has long been recognized as being rather restrictive. The 
actual practice of model-theorists is somewhat more in line with points of 
view from categorical logic Moreover a degree of flexibility is required to 
deal with various natural elaborations of and variants of first order defin? 
ability. 
Classification of uncountably categorical and related structures, up to bi- 
interpretability. This is a rather strong formulation of Zilber's program. 
In this form it will probably never be accomplished, but it subsumes an 
enormous amount of work in model theory: the geometry of strongly mini? 
mal sets, the mathematics around Hrushovski's amalgamation/fusion tech? 
niques, the structure of simple noncommutative groups of finite Morley rank 
(Cherlin's conjecture) and the theory of covers. Included in "related struc? 
tures" are the structures of finite SCZ-rank, say, where much ofthe geometric 
theory has still to be developed. 
Interpreted more loosely we could include here ongoing work in stability, 
its generalizations (such as simple theories), and the classification of first 
order theories. 
Model theory and analysis/geometry. It is hoped that the second part of 
Hilbert's 16th problem (uniform bounds on the number of limit cycles of 
polynomial planar vector fields) can be approached by finding suitably rich 
0-minimal expansions ofthe real field. 
The understanding of complex exponentiation is a major challenge, in 
particular Zilber's conjecture that the complex field equipped with the expo? 
nential function is "tame" modulo countable definable sets. 
Bimeromorphic geometry is concerned with the classification of compact 
complex manifolds up to bimeromorphic equivalence. There is a hope that 
geometric stability-theoretic methods would yield nontrivial results here, 
although maybe it is too early to teil. There are intriguing connections with 
"0-minimal complex analysis". 
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I also include here further development of model theoretic techniques and 
notions appropriate for metric spaces, Banach spaces and function spaces, 
as well as applications. 
Model theory and number theory. The kind of model-theoretic methods 
discussed in this article have not yet penetrated the central problems con- 
cerning rational points (namely over number fields) of varieties. This is 
a major challenge, and any progress would have to incorporate arithmetic 
features such as heights into associated model-theoretic structures. 
On the other hand, various theorems about rational points (such as 
Mordell-Lang over number fields) have equivalent model-theoretic state- 
ments (although not as yet model-theoretic proofs). In fact we have a new 
twist on the notion "fragments of arithmetic": Fix a variety V defined over 
Q and let My be the structure (C, +, ?, V(Q)) (so we adjoin a predicate for 
the rational points of V to the complex field). Is it the case that My is 
either stable or undecidable? What are the possible Turing degrees of such 
structures? Are these questions settled by the Lang conjectures on varieties 
of general type? 
Model theory and differential equations. I mean here the algebraic theory 
of differential equations and the structure of solution sets. Concerning 
ordinary differential equations, the fine structure of definable sets of finite 
Morley rank in differentially closed fields is relevant. A challenge is to extend 
finiteness theorems for equations of order 1 to the higher order case. For 
partial differential equations, infinite-dimensional sets (i.e. definable sets of 
infinite Morley rank in the appropriate structures) come into the picture, 
and are hardly understood at all model-theoretically. 
Another important problem is to identify and axiomatize the universal 
domains appropriate for the kind of "asymptotic differential algebra" em- 
bodied in Hardy fields. 
Finally, one would hope for model-theoretic methods (especially those 
discussed in this article) to be relevant to Grothendiek's conjecture in the 
arithmetic of linear differential equations. 
Finite and pseudofinite structures. I am referring here to the (first order) 
model-theoretic study of infinite limits (in various senses) of finite structures, 
and the light this sheds on uniformities in families of finite structures. (So 
this is not exactly the same as so-called finite model theory.) The work on 
smoothly approximable structures (Lachlan, Cherlin, Hrushovski [5], Kan- 
tor, Liebeck, Macpherson and others) as well as work on pseudofinite groups 
and fields falls under this rubric. The content and implications of pseud- 
ofiniteness (being an ultraproduct of finite structures) is an important issue. 
Hilbert's 10th problem over Q. This is very much related to the number 
theory discussion above. The problem is whether there is an effective way 
of deciding, given a finite system of polynomials in several variables with 
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rational coefficients, whether or not this system has a solution all of whose 
coordinates are rational numbers. Formulated logically it is the problem 
of the decidability of the existential theory of (Q, +, ?). (The full theory is 
undecidable.) Formulated geometrically it is the problem of deciding the 
existence of rational points on varieties defined over Q. A negative solution 
would follow from being able to existentially define the ring Z in the field Q. 
(A possible obstruction to this is a certain conjecture of Barry Mazur on the 
topology of rational points of varieties.) It is rather interesting that number 
theorists appear to favour a positive solution to the main problem. In fact 
in the case of curves (1-dimensional varieties), it has been conjectured that 
one can even compute the set of rational points. 
Vaught's conjecture. Vaught's conjecture for first order countable theories 
remains open: a first order countable theory has either at most co or exactly 
2m countable models. One hopes for a renewal ofthe "approach from below" 
started by Shelah for the co-stable case and continued by Buechler and 
Newelski for the superstable of finite rank case. It would be nice to see also 
an approach from above. In the more general context of Lm ,w theories, it is a 
special case ofthe Topological Vaught conjecture from descriptive set theory. 
Logic and mathematics. One theme in the discussion following the panel 
presentation was: how can logic increase its prestige within mathematics and 
how does one go about making a "splash" which mathematicians will take 
notice of? My feeling is that this is the wrong sort of question. If one wants 
some kind of meaningful interaction with other parts of mathematics, it is 
the conviction that this is a worthwhile intellectual enterprise, rather than 
the desire to make a "splash", which is crucial. This conviction amounts 
essentially to a belief in the unity of mathematics. There has been much 
discussion of this "unity of mathematics" in recent times, often in connection 
with deep conjectures relating arithmetic, geometry, analysis, representation 
theory etc. One feels moreover that logicians, especially in the light of their 
foundational concerns, should have some level of engagement with these 
issues and conjectures. There is another sociological aspect. In so far as 
logicians live and operate within mathematics departments there is a need to 
talk to and interact with the people around them. So the issue is that of a 
sensitivity to mathematics and educating our graduate students accordingly. 
I believe that with such a sensitivity, interactions and "splashes" will take 
care of themselves, and our subject, or rather its various branches, may end 
up being transformed in the process. 
Acknowledgement. Thanks to Lou van den Dries for his comments on an 
earlier draft. 
?5. Set theory, by Alexander Kechris. 
A) I will present here some speculations on future directions in set theory. 
Modern set theory is a vast and very diverse subject, so it is obvious that in 
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a short time I cannot possibly cover all important aspects of research in this 
field. I will also concentrate on discussing, in fairly broad terms, general 
programs and trends, as opposed to specific problems, with some obvious 
exceptions. 
B) For the purposes of this presentation, it will be convenient for me to 
distinguish two aspects of research in set theory: 
The first, which I will call internal or foundational, is concerned with the 
understanding and clarification ofthe basic concepts of set theory itself, and 
aims at providing a foundation for a comprehensive and satisfactory theory 
of sets. Since the time of Cantor, set theory has been continuously evolving 
towards that goal and this trend will undoubtedly continue in the future. 
The second aspect, which I will call external or interactive, deals with the 
connections of set theory with other areas of mathematics. This includes 
the use of set theoretic concepts, methods, and results in establishing the 
foundations or helping the development of other mathematical disciplines 
as well as the application of set theoretic techniques in the solution of specific 
problems in such areas. 
Of course, these two aspects, internal and external, are often closely inter- 
related. 
C) Also, following a well-established tradition going back to Cantor, it will 
be useful to subdivide the theory of sets into (i) The theory ofthe continuum or 
theory ofpointsets, i.e., the study of sets and functions on the reals, complex 
numbers, Euclidean spaces or, more generally, Polish (complete separable 
metric) spaces, and (ii) the general set theory of arbitrary sets and cardinals. 
An important further distinction in the theory of the continuum was 
introduced in the early 20th Century by the French, Russian, and Polish 
analysts, who laid the foundations of descriptive set theory or definability 
theory ofthe continuum, which is the study of definable (e.g., Borel, projective, 
etc.) sets and functions on Polish spaces. So we can subdivide the theory of 
the continuum into descriptive set theory and the theory of arbitrary pointsets. 
For example, a question such as the measurability of the projective sets 
belongs to the first part but the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) or the study 
of cardinal characteristics ofthe continuum belongs to the second. 
Again all these aspects of set theory are closely interrelated. With these 
classifications in mind, I will now discuss some prospects for research in set 
theory. 
Descriptive set theory. 
A) Work in the last 30 years or so has resulted in a resolution of the 
foundational (internal) issues facing descriptive set theory. There is now a 
very satisfactory and comprehensive foundation for the theory of definable 
sets and functions on Polish spaces, based on the principle of Definable 
Determinacy (see Kechris [36], Moschovakis [44]). This theory also fits 
beautifully within the framework of global set theory as currently developed 
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through the theory of large cardinals. The determinacy principle is in fact 
"equivalent", in an appropriate sense, to the existence of certain types of 
large cardinals (see Martin-Steel [43], Woodin [67]). Moreover the structure 
theory of definable sets in Polish spaces, that determinacy unveils, has a very 
close and deep relationship with the unfolding inner model theory of large 
cardinals, an example of which was so vividly illustrated in Itay Neeman's 
talk in this conference. 
B) Thus the foundational aspects of descriptive set theory are by and 
large settled now. Research in this area is now increasingly preoccupied with 
external issues. These consist of applying the ideas, methodology, and results 
of descriptive set theory, both in its classical and modern manifestations, to 
other areas of mathematics, while at the same time developing new directions 
in the theory itself which are motivated by such interactions. Interestingly, 
this also leads to the use of sophisticated methods and results from other 
areas of mathematics in the solution of purely set theoretic problems in 
descriptive set theory. 
Intriguing such connections have been discovered during the last 15 years 
or so in areas such as classical real analysis, harmonic analysis, Banach space 
theory, and ergodic theory (see, for example, Foreman et al. [19], Kahane- 
Salem [34], Kechris-Louveau [37]). More recently, a very promising new 
area, that is now very actively investigated, deals with the development of a 
theory of complexity of classification problems in mathematics, a classification 
problem being the question of cataloging a class of mathematical objects up 
to some notion of equivalence by invariants, and the closely related theory 
of descriptive dynamics, i.e., the theory of definable actions of Polish groups 
on Polish spaces (see Becker-Kechris [1], Hjorth [28], Kechris [35]). This 
work brings descriptive set theory into contact with current developments in 
various areas of mathematics such as dynamical systems, including ergodic 
theory and topological dynamics, the theory of topological groups and their 
representations, operator algebras, abelian and combinatorial group theory, 
etc Moreover, it provides new insights in the traditional relationships of 
descriptive set theory with other areas of mathematical logic, as, for example, 
with recursion theory, concerning the global structure of Turing degrees (see 
R Cholak et al. [6]), or with model theory, through the Topological Vaught 
Conjecture and the general study of the isomorphism relation on countable 
structures. 
Moving beyond descriptive set theory, I will concentrate on two other 
major aspects: the theory of large cardinals and the theory ofsmall cardinals. 
The theory of large cardinals. 
A) The goal of the theory of large cardinals is to understand the higher 
reaches of infinity and their effect on its lower levels. Another important as- 
pect here is the use of large cardinal principles as a global scale for calibrating 
the consistency strength of extensions of classical ZFC set theory. 
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Most of the effort in this area today is going towards the internal or foun? 
dational aspects of this theory, where a vigorous and far reaching program 
is actively pursued, dealing with the development of canonical inner mod? 
els for large cardinals and the detailed analysis of their structure, as well as 
their relationship with descriptive set theory (see Lowe-Steel [42], Steel [61]). 
This program is by no means complete yet, and it will undoubtedly be one 
of the main topics of set theoretic research in the foreseeable future. It is 
also closely interrelated to many other important directions of research in 
set theory, including infinite combinatorics and the development of forcing 
techniques (see the forthcoming Foreman et al. [18]). 
B) Simultaneously with the pursuit of the foundational goals, there have 
been several interesting external developments here as well. There is of 
course a long tradition of application of set theoretic techniques, involv- 
ing for example, forcing, infinite combinatorics as well as large cardinals, 
to many areas of abstract algebra, functional analysis, measure theory and 
general topology, for instance in obtaining significant independence and 
consistency results, as for example in the Whitehead Problem (Shelah; see 
Shelah [48]), the Kaplansky Conjecture (Dales, Esterle, Solovay, Woodin; 
see Dales-Woodin [12]), or the S- and L- space problems (see, for example, 
Todorcevic [62]), and this will of course continue in the future. More re- 
cently, large cardinal theory is finding its way into more concrete situations. 
H. Friedman (see, for example, Friedman [21]) applies combinatorics of 
large cardinals to obtain new combinatorial principles for finite sets. More? 
over he shows that these principles require, in an appropriate sense, these 
large cardinal hypotheses. Another interesting direction relates the structure 
of elementary embeddings associated with large cardinals to that of self- 
distributive algebras and braid groups, through work of Laver, Dehornoy, 
and others (see Dehornoy [13]). 
The theory of small cardinals. 
A) In this context, I include both the study of arbitrary pointsets, in 
particular problems such as the CH, as well as the theory of the "small" 
alephsNi, N2,... 
Here the foundational situation is far from clear. The theory of large 
cardinals has many important implications here, in particular in terms of 
consistency and independence results (see, for instance, Foreman-Magidor- 
Shelah [20]). However, it is well-known that in its present form, which is 
largely immune to forcing constructions, it does not resolve key issues such 
as the CH. It is clear that a satisfactory and comprehensive theory of small 
cardinals needs to be developed, within which we can hope to achieve the 
resolution of this basic set theoretic problem and related questions. 
B) A promising new approach along these lines has been recently initiated 
by Woodin (see Woodin [68]), which aims at developing a theory that leads 
to a "complete" understanding of the definability structure of the power 
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set of co\, P{co\), which will parallel the "complete" understanding ofthe 
definability structure ofthe power set of co, P(co), based on the principle of 
definable determinacy. Towards developing such a theory, Woodin proposes 
a new principle, concerning the definability structure of (an enriched form 
of) P(co\), which implies the failure of the CH, in fact it gives the answer 
2**? = ^2 for the value ofthe cardinality ofthe continuum. It is of course too 
early yet to know the full effect of this theory, and whether it will be eventually 
viewed as the "right" theory for the definability structure of P{co\), finally 
leading to a satisfactory resolution ofthe CH. This will require a much more 
detailed development of the theory than is presently available, and should 
be the focus of extensive research in the future. Even if this turns out to 
be successful, further questions concerning the theory of arbitrary pointsets 
and the structure of small cardinals would need the development of a theory 
of P{a>2), P{coi)..., for which no hints are available at this stage. 
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